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How Cognitive Ability and Financial Literacy
Shape the Demand for Financial Advice at Older Ages
The last four decades have seen a global trend toward disintermediation of retirement
saving and decumulation, as company-provided defined benefit pensions gave way to defined
contribution plans and governments’ old-age benefit programs developed shortfalls. Nevertheless,
shifting the risks of saving too little, investing poorly, and outliving assets to individuals does not
make such risks disappear. There is also growing evidence that retail investors have a difficult time
setting spending goals, paying debt, deciding how much and where to invest, determining when to
stop working and claim their retirement benefits, and handling insurance needs (e.g., Brüine de
Bruin, 2017; Mitchell, 2018). Financial disintermediation poses an even more significant challenge
when a large segment of the older population lacks financial sophistication (c.f., Finke, Howe, and
Huston, 2016; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).
This paper explores how cognition and financial literacy shortfalls influence older
Americans’ demand for financial advice. This issue is of concern since the older population holds
more wealth than do younger people, and when cognitive function deteriorates with age (Horn,
1968; Schroeder and Salthouse, 2004), this can undermine retirement security (Agarwal et al.,
2009). Prior research has examined stock market participation and allocation patterns, and there is
evidence that more cognitively able and financially literate people tend to participate in the stock
market and reap better investment returns (e.g., Bogan and Fertig, 2013; Christelis, Jappelli, and
Padula, 2010; Clark, Lusardi, and Mitchell, 2015; Cole and Shastry, 2014; Grinblatt, Keloharju,
and Linnainmaa, 2011; Kézdi and Willis, 2003; and van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011). It has
also been reported that older investors’ cognitive ability declines with age (Korniotis and Kumar,
2011). Of course, people unable to manage their finances in later life may be able to hire investment
professionals, thus substituting financial advisors’ inputs for their own (Kim, Maurer, and Mitchell
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2016; 2017). Yet cognitive ability and financial literacy can also affect the decision to delegate,
since delegation requires a complicated process of acquiring, screening, and monitoring
information about financial advisors and their services. Moreover, there is still no consensus on the
impact of cognitive ability and financial literacy on the demand for financial advice at older ages.
Accordingly, to evaluate whether cognitive ability and financial literacy have a protective
role helping older people make better decisions about when to seek – or avoid – financial advice,
we designed a purpose-built experimental module and fielded it in the 2016 Health and Retirement
Study (HRS). Here we asked people age 50+ several questions about whether they had obtained
financial advice, and if so, which types of advice they sought. For those who did not access
financial advice, we also asked them why they had not. To this module, we link a rich array of
information from the core HRS including cognitive ability scores, financial literacy scores, sociodemographic factors, wealth, and health. Using a novel instrumental variable (IV) approach, we
trace the causal impacts of cognitive ability and financial literacy on older peoples’ financial
behavior focusing on their demand for financial advice.
Our results show that cognitive ability and financial literacy affect the quality, but not the
quantity, of financial advice that older persons seek out. Specifically, cognitive ability and financial
literacy do not affect the likelihood of seeking financial advice, but they do influence the types of
financial advice people to receive. More cognitively able and financially literate individuals are
more likely to obtain financial advice from professional advisors and they are more likely to receive
‘free’ financial consultations with commission-based payments to professional advisors. This
result is consistent with Inderst and Ottaviani’s (2012a) theoretical prediction that sophisticated
consumers understand that commission-based payments can be an effective way to induce advisors
to learn about financial products suitable for their customers. The economic significance of our
results is also sizable: for instance, in our preferred IV specification, one standard deviation
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improvement in cognitive ability leads to a 11.8 percent greater chance of seeking professional
financial advice, and a 14.7 percent higher chance of having obtained ‘free’ advice. One standard
deviation higher financial literacy score boosts the probability of obtaining professional financial
advice by 6.5 percent.
Because only around one-third (35 percent) of our older respondents indicated that they
ever sought financial advice, we also asked the others why they did not. Responses indicate that
more cognitively able respondents lack trust in financial advisors: a cognition score one standard
deviation higher is associated with a 30.8 percent greater chance of distrusting financial advisors.
Accordingly, cognitive ability plays an important role in determining who trusts financial advisors,
and trust is a significant predictor of the demand for financial advice (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 2015).
Our analysis offers potential lessons for policymakers. For instance, Inderst and Ottaviani
(2012a) predict that commission-based advice can be welfare-enhancing for investors who
understand advisors’ potential conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, they also note that advisors paid
via commissions could also exploit naïve investors who believe that the advice provided is
unbiased. Our empirical results show that people with high cognitive ability do utilize the free
consultations, and therefore have policy implications for financial consumer protection: scrapping
commission-based payment would not necessarily increase consumer welfare. Mandating fee
disclosure would be likely to help protect cognitively impaired investors, while commission-based
payments would help sophisticated investors obtain low-cost financial help.
In what follows, we first briefly summarize prior research on financial management patterns
in later life. Next, we discuss anticipated hypotheses linking cognitive ability, financial literacy,
and the demand for financial advice. Following a discussion of empirical results using our HRS
module, a final section concludes.

5

Related Studies and Hypothesis Development
Three related threads in the literature are relevant to our research: (1) studies on investors’
limited attention; (2) analyses of financial illiteracy; and (3) inquiries into the complex institutional
environment confronting older persons when they make financial decisions. We touch on each, in
turn.
In the context of a life-cycle model with stochastic labor income and endogenous work
effort, Kim, Maurer, and Mitchell (2016, 2017) showed that, early in life, individuals deriving
utility from consumption and leisure will rationally devote little or no attention to their retirement
portfolios. 1 This is because managing a portfolio consumes mental resources, and devoting time
to the task imposes an opportunity cost – employees lose the chance to invest in job-specific human
capital. When people managing their own investments must do so at the expense of future labor
income growth, they would benefit from hiring financial advisors so as to decrease the costs of
managing their own finances. Naturally, delegating one’s investments to an advisor also entails a
monetary cost, so this tradeoff must be dynamically re-evaluated over the life cycle. Young
workers have little wealth, yet they have the longest time horizon over which to reap the rewards
of sound financial advice. Older individuals may value input from financial advisors to the extent
that they experience declining mental faculties, making it more challenging to do the job on their
own.

Other authors have also postulated that a rational, fully-informed, forward-looking individual makes optimal decisions
regarding saving, portfolio choice, asset location, benefit claiming, while taking into consideration individual factors
such as preferences (risk, time, leisure, bequest, intertemporal substitution, loss aversion), mortality, health, and family
status (e.g., Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005, Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira, 2008, Hubener, Maurer, and Mitchell,
2016, and Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell, 2016). None integrates the opportunity cost of managing one’s own finances,
however, which we believe to be an important factor driving the life cycle demand for financial advice. Pagel (2018)
recently introduced news-utility theory to show within a life-cycle portfolio choice model that such (behavioral)
preferences are able to account for inattention, predict realistic stock portfolio shares, involve non-participation in the
stock market, and include a willingness to pay for delegated portfolio management.

1
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A second reason that older people may seek financial advice is that many of them are
financially illiterate, leading them to undersave and underinvest (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014;
Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell, 2017; Clark, Lusardi, and Mitchell, 2015; Choi, Laibson, and
Madrian, 2011; Choi, 2015). Many older adults make mistakes when managing their finances in
both developed and developing countries (e.g., Badarinza, Campbell, and Ramadorai, 2016;
Badarinza, Balasubramaniam, and Ramadorai, 2019). Somewhat surprisingly, and despite
objective confirmation of an age-linked decline in financial capability at older ages, the evidence
shows that older persons’ self-confidence in their own financial ability rises with age, peaking at
about age 88. 2 To this point, there is now a growing literature on the consequences of poor financial
capability in later life (Agarwal et al., 2009). For instance, the FINRA Investor Education
Foundation (2013) found that over 80 percent of adults of all ages had been solicited for potentially
fraudulent offers, while older Americans were the most likely targets and most likely to lose money
when targeted (DeLiema and Deevy, 2017). Even worse, education has only a limited role in
protecting older peoples’ financial management capabilities (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2005;
Fernandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer, 2014).
A third reason that older persons may seek financial advice is that institutional complexity
bedevils the decisions people must confront when planning for, making provision for, and moving
into retirement. In the US, for instance, rules regarding when to claim one’s Social Security benefits
are extremely complicated, particularly if one has a spouse who is also entitled (or will be entitled)
to Social Security benefits (Kotlikoff, Moeller, and Solman, 2016). There are also numerous and
quite complex regulations regarding how much people may save in tax-qualified retirement savings
accounts, when someone can make penalty-free payouts, and when an individual must begin taking

See Mazzonna and Peracchi (2018) and Hammond, Mitchell, and Utkus (2017) for a discussion of cognitive changes
with aging.
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required minimum distributions from these accounts (Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell, 2016). These
realities become particularly challenging when cognitive ability declines with age. Therefore,
complex financial products and services can present an obstacle to sound financial outcomes when
older adults' cognitive ability declines (Agarwal and Mazumder, 2013).
Few studies to date have focused on older individuals per se in this context, but the literature
does indicate that retail investors who suffer from behavioral biases can be protected by good
financial advisors (Shapira and Venezia 2001). 3 Also, Kramer (2012) found that portfolios advised
by financial advisors were less prone to home bias or over-concentration in their own countries.
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) reported that portfolio risk-return efficiency improved for persons who
actually followed the advice. Using a Dutch household survey, von Gaudecker (2015) discovered
that households who engaged professional advisors achieved significant portfolio diversification
benefits, measured in terms of return loss. Financial advice can also help with estate planning and
tax management (Cici, Kempf, and Sorhage, 2017). Financial decisions become difficult for those
unable to process financial information readily (Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula, 2010; Bertrand
and Morse, 2011), for present-biased individuals who procrastinate making financial decisions
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), and for those who distrust or cannot evaluate advice (Gino, 2008;
Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a; Agnew et al., 2018). 4 To date, however, no empirical analysis has

There is also a literature reporting negative outcomes from hiring financial advisors, though again, few have focused
on older adults. For instance, Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) and Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) reported
that broker-sold mutual funds underperformed direct-sold mutual funds. Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012)
studied independent financial advisors and bank-affiliated advisors in Germany, finding that accounts advised by both
types of advisors did not generate higher risk-adjusted returns than those without advice. Using Swiss data, Hoechle
et al. (2017) found that trades advised by financial advisors underperformed trades initiated by account holders. One
of the very few analyses of retirement plans by Chalmers and Reuter (2015) concluded for Oregon State University
System Retirement Plan that broker-advised retirement accounts had lower risk-adjusted returns because of high-fee
investments.
4
Several studies have examined how advisors’ conflicts of interest can shape households’ advice-seeking behavior
(e.g., Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012b; Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner, 2011; Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2007; Piccolo,
Puopolo, and Vasconcelos, 2016); and Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2012).
3
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linked older persons’ demand for financial advice with cognitive ability and financial literacy, as
we do here.
There are several possible links between cognitive ability, financial literacy, and the
probability of seeking financial advice at older ages, as well as the type of advice sought. What we
seek to determine is whether older people suffering from cognitive shortfalls are more or less likely
to seek financial advice. The anticipated directionality could be either positive or negative. If
cognitive ability and financial literacy effectively reduce peoples’ time cost associated with
managing their own financial tasks (Kim, Maurer, and Mitchell, 2016), older people with high
cognitive ability and financial literacy will need less financial advice. Nevertheless, screening and
monitoring financial advisors also require consumers to expend cognitive and financial resources,
so cognitive ability and financial literacy can boost the demand for financial advisory services. In
addition, some older investors would rationally delegate managing their finances to others when
they recognize that their ability to manage finances has declined. Of course, others, mistakenly
believing that their acumen remains intact, might retain these management tasks without asking for
help. In other words, the net impact of the link remains to be established empirically.
As a null hypothesis, we posit that the two opposing effects of cognitive ability and financial
literacy on the demand for financial advice might offset each other:
Hypothesis 1 (Likelihood of seeking financial advice): Cognitive ability and financial
literacy will not be significantly related to the likelihood of seeking financial advice.
If this null hypothesis is rejected and the estimated impact is positive (negative, respectively), this
would imply that the positive (negative, respectively) impact of cognitive ability and financial
literacy on the demand for financial advice dominates.
Hypothesis 1 focuses on the quantity of financial advice sought by older adults, yet customer
sophistication can also affect the quality of advice. All financial advice does not require the same
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levels of sophistication and knowledge. For example, receiving help from professional advisors
requires more sophistication on the customer’s side than does getting help with simple money
management tasks from family members (e.g., bill payment). Receiving high-quality but
potentially biased advice from professional financial advisors using a commission-based payment
structure requires fairly sophisticated consumers: thus Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) predicted that
unsophisticated consumers will not fully incorporate potential conflicts of interest due to
commission-based fees when they assess the quality of financial advice received. By contrast, they
indicated that sophisticated customers may understand that commission-based fees can be an
effective incentive to get advisers to learn about the suitability of complex financial products for
their customers’ needs. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2 (Quality of financial advice received): Among those receiving financial advice,
greater cognitive ability and financial literacy will increase the likelihood of seeking
financial advice from professionals.
A natural corollary of Hypothesis 2 is that people with high cognitive ability and financial
literacy would be able to utilize the ‘free’ professional consultation as an effective incentive tool,
even though it also embodies potential conflicts of interest. Accordingly, testing Hypothesis 2
offers insights relevant to policymakers and financial advisory service providers. For instance, if
older persons of low cognitive ability and financial literacy seek advice that is conflicted,
policymakers may believe it necessary to devise mechanisms to protect them from potentially
exploitive services.

10

Methodology and Data
We designed and fielded an experimental module in the 2016 HRS to explore how people
age 50+ manage their financial affairs. 5 This pilot module, assigned randomly, has a smaller
sample than the core HRS modules by construction; it consists of 1,594 age-eligible respondents
(age 50+) who responded to our questions on their financial behaviors. 6 Specifically, we asked
respondents whether they received any type of financial advice, and if so, what types of financial
advice they received and from whom. Additionally, we asked persons who did not seek financial
advice why they did not (see Appendix 1 for details). Accordingly, sample sizes for our financial
behavior questions differ depending on how respondents answered precursor questions.
Summary statistics on our financial behavior variables and several controls gathered from
other core HRS surveys appear in Table 1 (pairwise correlations of variables are shown in
Appendix 2). Responses to the first Module question shows that only one-third (35 percent) of the
age 50+ respondents indicated that they received advice on money management (Get help w/money
mgmt). Of those who did, half received advice on investments (Help w/invst), and a large majority
(74 percent) of those sought help from a professional outside of their family/friends network. A
sizeable fraction (13 percent) said they received ‘free’ professional advice, which of course is
unlikely to be completely free as commissions or fees are embedded in the products purchased.
Focusing on respondents who sought no financial advice, 51 percent said they were confident
enough to manage the money on their own (No money help: Self-confidence); 3 percent indicated
they did not trust advisors (No money help: Distrust); and 3 percent indicated they did not know
whom to ask (No money help: DK whom to ask).

For more on the HRS, see Fisher et al (2017).
The module was assigned to 1,982 nonproxy interviews; of these 1,694 answered the module; 1,627 of these were
age eligible (≥ age 50); and 33 were dropped due to missing data.

5
6
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Table 1 here
Next, we link participants’ answers to other core HRS queries on their education, wealth,
age, race/ethnicity, and marital status, as well as a widely-used measure of cognitive ability
(Cognition score), defined as the sum of the respondent’s total word recall and mental status
indices. 7 Additionally, we collect the respondent’s financial literacy (FinLit score) score, an index
that refers to the total number of correct answers to the four financial literacy questions in the HRS
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). Table 1 Panel B shows that the average Cognition score is 23.61
(maximum of 35) with a standard deviation of 4.61. The FinLit score averages 2.12 (maximum of
3) with a standard deviation of 0.89. Cognition and FinLit are positively correlated with a Pearson
correlation coefficient of 0.32 (significant at the 1% level). The other variables are as expected:
respondents average 64 years of age (the age range was 50 to 98), and 45 percent of the sample is
male. Most HRS respondents are White (80 percent) or Hispanic (10 percent); and most (62 percent)
of respondents are married. Average education is 13.6 years, and respondents hold an average of
net non-housing wealth of about $136,000, and housing net wealth of $157,000. 8

Empirical Analysis
To evaluate how financial behaviors of interest relate to respondents’ cognitive ability and
financial literacy holding other factors constant, we estimate multivariate Probit models of the
following form:
Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ) = Φ(𝛽𝛽1 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 × 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 ′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ),

(1)

Word recall measures performance on immediate and delayed word recall, naming tasks (e.g., date-naming), and
vocabulary questions. The mental status index sums scores from serial 7’s and counting backward tests. See St. Clair
et al. (2011) and Fisher et al. (2017).
8
All monetary values are provided in real $2014.
7
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where the dependent variable measures the probability of respondent i indicating that he or she
engaged in the behavior of interest (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1). The term Φ(∙) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution with respect to the control variables of the Probit model. To mitigate potential

confounding effects, other controls besides cognition and financial literacy noted above are
included in the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 . Marginal effects are reported, and standard errors are clustered at the

household level.

It is possible that estimates of equation (1) could be biased due to unobservable omitted
variables. For example, Cognition and FinLit might reflect some unobservable personal traits that
could also affect the demand for financial advice. Cognition and FinLit may also affect the
respondent’s financial portfolio in ways not observed in the survey, thus influencing the quantity
and quality of financial advice. If true, these could prejudice the causal interpretation of the
coefficient estimates in equation (1). To address this potential endogeneity concern, we undertake
an instrumental variable (IV) analysis for each of our two key explanatory variables. For the
Cognitive variable, we turn to medical evidence reporting that vision dysfunction is strongly related
to poor cognitive ability among older adults (Chen, Bhattacharya, and Pershing, 2017). Moreover,
Rogers and Langa (2010) also conclude that poor vision is strongly associated with dementia and
other cognitive diseases such as Alzheimer's. Accordingly, we construct a variable called Vision
problem which takes the value of one if the respondent’s eyesight was self-reported to be
fair/poor/legally blind (and zero otherwise). We use this variable as an IV for cognitive ability. For
the FinLit variable, we follow van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2012) and use an instrument
variable whether the respondent self-reported having taken an economics/finance course in school
(Economics class).
Table 1 shows the values of Vision problem and Economics class average 21 and 34 percent,
respectively. Our first-stage regression (Appendix Table A3) confirms that Vision problem and
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Cognition are negatively and statistically significantly related: specifically, a one standard
deviation increase in vision problems is associated with a 1.6 percent decrease in the Cognition
score (= -0.941×0.41/23.9). We also find that having taken an Economics class is positively and
statistically significantly linked to financial literacy scores: a one standard deviation increase in
Economics class is associated with a 5.6 percent increase in FinLit (=0.249×0.48/2.12).
A potential concern regarding the exclusion restriction is that Vision Problem and
Economics class might also affect the demand for financial advice, in that people in better health
and who hold more (or less) wealth would seek out advice. To protect against this possibility, our
empirical models also hold constant the respondent’s health and housing/non-housing wealth. After
controlling for possible alternative channels through which the IVs affect the demand for financial
advice, we believe that these variables satisfy the exclusion restriction conditions necessary for
instrumental variables. Below we present both OLS and IV results of our two key variables on
financial behaviors of interest.
Table 1 here

Results: Who Seeks Financial Advice and What Type?
Table 2 reports the factors associated with seeking financial advice as well as the types of
advice that respondents indicated they received. In each case, we report marginal effects from the
Probit and IV Probit regressions to facilitate a comparison of the impact of addressing endogeneity
concerns. Columns 1-2 of this table indicate that Cognition and FinLit are unrelated to the take-up
of financial advice in both the OLS and IV models. Accordingly, the unconditional probability of
receiving any financial advice is unaffected by cognitive ability or financial literacy, holding other
factors constant. Even for those who do receive financial advice, Cognition scores and FinLit
scores are uncorrelated with the probability of receiving financial advice regarding sophisticated
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financial topics such as investments (Column 3). Additionally, the IV analysis (Column 4) confirms
that, for those who do seek financial advice, the probability of receiving more sophisticated
financial advice (e.g., about investments) is not statistically significantly associated with Cognition
score and FinLit score. Overall, our results in columns 1-4 do not reject the null hypothesis that
cognitive ability and financial literacy are unrelated to the quantity of financial advice people
receive (Hypothesis 1).
Table 2 here
Next, we evaluate how cognitive ability and financial literacy shape the quality of financial
advice people receive, testing Hypothesis 2. Table 2, Column 5 shows that Cognition and FinLit
scores are both positively related to receiving advice from professional financial advisors. In other
words, more cognitively able and financially literate respondents are more likely to seek
professional financial advice, rather than receiving casual help from family/friends. The IV
analysis (Column 6) confirms that this positive association is attributable to the causal impact of
Cognition and FinLit. The economic magnitudes of these are also sizable: a one standard deviation
rise in Cognition score is associated with a 11.8 percent higher (=0.019×4.61/0.74) chance, and a
standard deviation increase in FinLit is associated with a 6.5 percent higher (=0.054×0.89/0.74)
chance of seeking professional advice. Put differently, cognitive decline induces people age 70+
(with average cognition score of 22.28) to be about 6 percent (=0.019× (22.28 − 24.71)/0.74)
less likely to seek professional financial advice, compared to their counterparts in their 60s (average

cognition score of 24.71). Financial illiteracy also plays a role, reducing the probability of seeking
professional advice by 2 percent (=0.054× (1.96 − 2.24)/0.74) for those age 70+ versus people
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in their 60’s. 9 These results support Hypothesis 2, in that both cognitive ability and financial
literacy do shape who older people ask when they seek financial advice.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 2 report how Cognition and FinLit influence the probability of
receiving so-called ‘free’ professional financial advice. A corollary of Hypothesis 2 is that more
sophisticated consumers might elect ‘free’ consultation despite the possibility of conflicts of
interest when they understand that advisors get paid via the products and are therefore better
incentivized to collect more information. Both the OLS and IV analyses (Columns 7-8) indicate
that those scoring higher on Cognition are, indeed, more likely to seek free financial advice: a one
standard deviation rise in Cognition scores is associated with a 14.7 percent (=0.004× 4.61/0.13)

higher chance of seeking this sort of advice. Respondents’ FinLit score is not statistically
significantly related to the likelihood of receiving free financial advice. Accordingly, our results
support the theoretical prediction by Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) that more sophisticated
investors understand that commission-based payments can provide effective incentives to financial
advisors to find suitable financial products for their needs.
Other results in Table 2 are also worth noting. Better-educated respondents are more likely
to receive financial advice in the OLS equation (Column 1), but the result is attenuated in the IV
analysis (Column 2). The IV analysis shows that better-educated people also tend to seek advice
from professional advisors (Column 6) and are less likely to get free consulting (Column 8). People
with more housing wealth are more likely to receive financial advice on investment (Column 3)
but this becomes insignificant in the IV analysis (Column 4). Older people are less likely to receive
professional financial advice (Column6), but more ‘free’ help (Column 8).

9

Average Cognition (Finlit) scores for persons in their 60s, 70s, and 80+ are 24.71 (2.24), 22.28 (1.96) and 19.73
(1.88), respectively.
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Taken as a whole, then, Table 2 suggests that cognitively able and financially literate
respondents seek professional advice rather resorting to casual or informal help. Since cognitive
ability and financial literacy do not affect the likelihood of seeking financial advice based on the
IV analysis, we conclude that cognitive ability and financial literacy determine the quality rather
than the quantity of financial advice sought.

Why Does Not Seek Financial Advice?
Two-thirds of the older HRS respondents reported that they did not seek financial advice,
leading us to ask why. Table 3 presents marginal effects from Probit and IV Probit models of
reasons people give for not receiving financial advice, where we link these to Cognition and FinLit
scores as well as self-confidence, distrust, and lack of knowledge as potential explanations. Column
1 reports marginal effects from Probit models of self-confidence, where we see that people scoring
poor on Cognition believe they can handle their financial management duties without others’ help.
Interestingly, this result is again attenuated in the IV models (Column 2). The FinLit score is
positively correlated with self-confidence, but this relation is not statistically significant. In other
words, we find little evidence that Cognition and FinLit scores are related to self-confidence.
Table 3 here
Another potential reason for not receiving financial advice could be distrust of financial
advisors (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2015). Columns 3-4 of Table 3 present marginal effects
from Probit and IV Probit models regressing Distrust on Cognition and FinLit as well as other
controls. The IV Probit model, in which we place more confidence, indicates that more cognitively
able persons tend to select the distrust issue as a reason for not seeking financial advice. One
standard deviation higher Cognition score is associated with a 30.8 percent greater
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(=0.002×4.61/0.03) chance of stating that distrust is the reason for not seeking financial advice.
FinLit is not statistically significantly related to this outcome.
Table 3 also shows results from Probit and IV Probit regressions of “Do not know whom
to ask” on Cognition and FinLit as well as the other controls. The Probit and IV Probit (Columns
5-6) show that Cognition and FinLit scores are not tightly related to the lack of knowledge about
whom to ask for financial advice. In the IV Probit estimation, few of the control variables are
related to self-confidence and lack of knowledge. One that does stand out appears in Column (4),
where older non-white men with less education are more likely to indicate distrust as a reason for
not receiving financial advice.
Overall, Table 3 indicates that cognitive ability is an important factor associated with older
people’s trust in financial advisors. Specifically, more cognitively able individuals tend to report
that they do not seek financial advice due to distrust. Combined with our earlier results showing
that cognitive ability encourages ‘free’ financial consultation, Table 3 implies that older people
who maintain high cognitive ability have a more cautious attitude toward receiving financial advice
that may embody potential conflicts of interests. Financial literacy plays a less important role.

Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has explored the impact of two important factors driving the demand for
financial advice in an aging population: cognitive ability and financial literacy. Given increasingly
complex financial products and the disintermediation of retirement decisions, many older persons
with substantial savings may not be able to manage financial tasks on their own, so it is important
to understand how they hire financial advisors. We find that cognitive ability and financial literacy
both help shape the quality, but not the quantity, of financial advice sought by older persons. While
cognitive ability and financial literacy scores are not significantly related to the probability of
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seeking financial advice, being more cognitively able and financially literate does enhance the
chance that older people seek advice from more sophisticated sources, such as professional
advisors. This could be because they understand potential conflict of interests embedded in
professional advisors’ recommendations, yet they understand that professional advisors will seek
suitable financial products for their customers’ needs (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a). Our IV
analysis implies that a standard deviation increase in cognitive ability and financial literacy
increases the chances of seeking financial advice from professionals, rather than family members,
by 11.8 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. We also find that more cognitively able respondents
tend to distrust financial advisors, suggesting that cognitive ability may protect them from
potentially deceptive financial advice practices.
The fact that both cognitive ability and financial literacy help shape the quality of financial
advice sought implies that the mere existence of financial advisors will not, on its own, correct suboptimal financial practices by some older households. Our work shows that low cognitive ability
and poor financial literacy can be a barrier to receiving quality financial advice, implying that
researchers and policymakers may need to find new ways to evaluate and monitor financial
behavior for an aging population. Financial institutions are likely to find it useful to enhance
protections for their older customers; efforts along these lines include a program teaching bank
tellers how to recognize when customers show signs of declining mental capacity or are being
financially exploited (Gunther, 2015). Various federal agencies also handle complaints regarding
financial fraud, and some states have passed laws seeking to protect elders from financial
exploitation, for instance, allowing triple damages for victims winning legal cases against their
perpetrators (DeLiema and Deevy, 2017).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables
This table presents summary statistics for our main variables. The full sample includes 1,594 HRS module respondents.
All variables defined in Appendix Table A1. Results use HRS weights.

A. Financial Behaviors
Variable
Any Financial Help
Help w/ financial mgmt (0/1)

Mean St Dev

Respondent Group

0.35

0.48

Full sample

Types of Financial Advice
Help w/ invst (0/1)

0.52

0.50

Those receiving financial advice

Help from profl/other non-family
advisors (0/1)

0.74

0.44

Those receiving financial advice

‘Free’ profl help (0/1)

0.13

0.33

Those receiving financial advice

No money help: Self-confidence (0/1)

0.51

0.50

Those not receiving financial advice

No money help: Distrust (0/1)

0.03

0.17

Those not receiving financial advice

No money help: DK whom to ask
(0/1)

0.04

0.19

Those not receiving financial advice

Reasons for Not Seeking Advice

B. Controls

Variable
Cognition score
FinLit score
Age
Male
White
Hispanic
Married
Education (yrs)
Good health
Non-housing wealth (/100k, 2014$)
Housing wealth (/100k, 2014$)
Vision problem
Economic class

Mean St Dev
23.61
4.61
2.12
0.89
64.11 10.18
0.45
0.50
0.80
0.40
0.10
0.30
0.62
0.49
13.60
2.74
0.76
0.43
1.36
4.31
1.57
9.69
0.21
0.41
0.35
0.48
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Table 2. Determinants of Financial Advice Seeking

This table presents marginal estimates from Probit analysis (odd-numbered Columns) and IV Probit (even-numbered Columns) of four key financial behaviors:
Help w/ financial mgmt, Help w/ invst, Help from profl/other non fmaily advisors, and’Free’ profl help. All dependent variables are binary; see Appendix 1 for
variable definitions. Regressors include missing data controls. Standard errors reported in parentheses and clustered at the household level. * and ** represent
statistical significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively. Results use HRS weights.
Full sample
Those receiving financial advice
Help w/ financial
Help w/ invst (0/1)
Help from
‘Free’ profl help
profl/other non
mgmt (0/1)
(0/1)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Probit
IVProbit
IVProbit
IVProbit
Probit
Probit
IVProbit
Probit
Cognition score
-0.008
-0.008
0.015
0.012
0.022 **
0.019 **
0.007 *
0.004 **
(0.004)
(0.058)
(0.009)
(0.074)
(0.006)
(0.031)
(0.003)
(0.052)
FinLit score
0.031
0.023
-0.009
0.001
0.050
0.054 **
-0.006
-0.013
(0.021)
(0.176)
(0.041)
(0.280)
(0.034)
(0.519)
(0.020)
(0.005)
Age
-0.002
-0.002
0.000
0.000
-0.001
-0.001 **
0.001
0.000 **
(0.002)
(0.007)
(0.003)
(0.008)
(0.002)
(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.008)
Male
-0.035
-0.032
-0.039
-0.041
-0.016
-0.012 *
-0.008
-0.008 *
(0.034)
(0.090)
(0.072)
(0.160)
(0.051)
(0.172)
(0.032)
(0.058)
White
0.115 **
0.138
0.207 *
0.141
0.122
0.071 **
-0.031
-0.009 **
(0.041)
(0.117)
(0.094)
(0.263)
(0.077)
(0.116)
(0.062)
(0.136)
Hispanic
-0.060
-0.077
0.074
0.063
-0.006
0.010
-0.077 **
-0.207
(0.057)
(0.066)
(0.118)
(0.128)
(0.075)
(0.154)
(0.020)
(0.098)
Married
-0.001
-0.004
0.103
0.099
0.177 **
0.144
-0.011
-0.023
(0.036)
(0.058)
(0.075)
(0.139)
(0.058)
(0.082)
(0.036)
(0.055)
Education (yrs)
0.037 **
0.034
0.031
0.026
0.013
0.017 **
-0.006
-0.002 **
(0.008)
(0.031)
(0.017)
(0.072)
(0.010)
(0.027)
(0.007)
(0.040)
Good health
0.094 *
0.080
0.191 *
0.163
0.087
0.076
0.038
0.083
(0.038)
(0.076)
(0.083)
(0.224)
(0.063)
(0.084)
(0.030)
(0.085)
Non-housing wealth (/100k, 2014$)
0.010 *
0.009
-0.002
-0.002
0.013 *
0.011
-0.001
0.000
(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.003)
(0.006)
Housing wealth (/100k, 2014$)
0.001
0.001
0.054 **
0.047
0.021
0.021
0.000
0.000
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.020)
(0.039)
(0.015)
(0.021)
(0.001)
(0.001)
N
1,594
1,594
417
417
439
439
439
439
Pseudo R-sq/Log likelihood
0.082
0.138
0.289
0.048
-40,189,660
-13,387,416
-13,226,950
-13,309,146
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Table 3. Factors Associated with Not Seeking Financial Advice

This table presents marginal estimates from Probit analysis (odd-numbered columns) and IV Probit (even-numbered
columns) for factors explaining why people did not seek financial advice: Self-confidence, Distrust, and DK whom to
ask. These are regressed on Cognition score and FinLit score along with other controls. All dependent variables are
binary; see Appendix 1 for detailed definitions. Regressors include missing data controls. Standard errors reported in
parentheses and clustered at the household level. * and ** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% level,
respectively. Results use HRS weights.

No money help: SelfNo money help:
No money help: DK
confidence (0/1)
whom to ask (0/1)
Distrust (0/1)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Probit
IVProbit
Probit
IVProbit
IVProbit
Probit
Cognition score
-0.014 **
-0.013
0.000
0.002 **
0.003
0.004
(0.005)
(0.051)
(0.000)
(0.010)
(0.002)
(0.018)
FinLit score
0.017
0.014
0.001
0.007
-0.007
-0.013
(0.024)
(0.160)
(0.002)
(0.056)
(0.006)
(0.039)
Age
0.008 **
0.007
0.000
0.000 **
0.000
0.000
(0.002)
(0.009)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.002)
Male
0.051
0.045
0.006 *
0.031 *
0.013
0.016
(0.042)
(0.096)
(0.003)
(0.061)
(0.011)
(0.019)
White
0.073
0.055
-0.001
-0.009 *
-0.047 **
-0.044
(0.048)
(0.085)
(0.003)
(0.035)
(0.018)
(0.024)
Hispanic
-0.019
0.000
-0.004 *
-0.048
-0.017 **
-0.042
(0.066)
(0.071)
(0.002)
(0.085)
(0.006)
(0.031)
Married
0.045
0.044
0.002
0.014
0.015
0.021
(0.043)
(0.056)
(0.002)
(0.022)
(0.009)
(0.029)
Education (yrs)
0.005
0.003
0.000
-0.001 *
-0.002
-0.003
(0.008)
(0.023)
(0.001)
(0.006)
(0.002)
(0.008)
Good health
0.075
0.072
0.002
0.014
0.011
0.014
(0.047)
(0.059)
(0.003)
(0.022)
(0.009)
(0.023)
Non-housing wealth (/100k, 2014$) 0.003
0.003
0.000
0.001
-0.003
-0.004
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.005)
Housing wealth (/100k, 2014$)
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
(0.001)
N
1,155
1,155
1,130
1,130
1,130
1,130
Pseudo R-sq/Log likelihood
0.041
0.112
0.112
-26,712,344
-23,050,123
-23,176,645
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Appendix Table A1. Variable Descriptions
Note: R refers to HRS Respondent

A. Financial Behaviors (questions detailed in the 2016 HRS Module) 10
Seeks Any Financial Help
Help w/ financial mgmt. (0/1) is a binary variable equal to one if R got help with money
management in past year (Item v106=1), 0 else.
Types of Financial Advice
Help w/ invst (0/1) is a binary variable equal to one if R got help with investing stocks, bonds or
mutual funds, 0 else.
Help from profl/other non-family advisors (0/1) (v108=4, 5, 6, 7, 8; advisor_help3) =1 if R gets
help from professional financial advisors or other nonfamily member; 0 else
Free’ profl help (0/1) (v112=7; free_advice1) = 1 if R gets help for free from professional advisor; 0
else
Reasons for Not Seeking Advice
No money help: Overconfidence (0/1) is a binary variable equal to one if R did not receive financial
advice because he can do financial management on his own, 0 else.
No money help: Distrust (0/1) is a binary variable equal to one if R did not receive financial advice
due to no trust in financial advisors, 0 else.
No money help: DK whom to ask (0/1) is a binary variable equal to one if R did not financial
advice because he knows no one to ask, 0 else.

B. Control variables (from HRS Core)
Cognition score: Sum of total word recall and mental status summary scores (0-35)
FinLit score: Sum of number of correct answers to four financial literacy questions.
Age: R age in years
Male: binary variable equal to one if R male, 0 else.
White: binary variable equal to one if R white, 0 else.
Hispanic: binary variable equal to one if R Hispanic, 0 else.
Married: binary variable equal to one if R married , 0 else.
Education: number of years of education
Good health: binary variable equal to one R reports health status excellent/good, 0 else.
Non-housing wealth: net value of non-housing financial wealth (stock, saving, CDs, bonds, and
other saving less debt) in 2014 $100,000s.
Housing wealth: net value of housing (value of 1ry residence less mortgages and home loans) in
2014 $100,000s.
C. Instrumental variables
Vision problem: A binary variable equal to one if R has a vision problem (eyesight is fair, poor or
legally blind), 0 else.
Economic class: A binary variable equal to one if R had an economics/finance class in school, 0 else.

10

https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/documentation
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Appendix Table A2. Pairwise Correlations for Key Variables.
Results use HRS weights.

Help w/ financial mgmt (0/1)
Help w/ invst (0/1)
Help from profl/other non-family
advisors (0/1)
'Free’ profl help (0/1)
No money help: Self-confidence (0/1)
No money help: Distrust (0/1)
No money help: DK whom to ask (0/1)
Cognition score
FinLit score
Age
Male
White
Hispanic
Married
Education (yrs)
Good health
Non-housing wealth (/100k, 2014$)
Housing wealth (/100k, 2014$)
Vision problem
Economic class
N

Help from
Help w/
profl/other
financial
non-family
Help w/
mgmt
advisors
invst (0/1)
(0/1)
(0/1)
1.00
1.00
0.40
0.08

0.10
0.14
0.00
-0.01
0.15
-0.13
0.05
0.23
0.16
0.15
0.04
-0.13
0.08
1,594

0.25
0.13
-0.05
-0.03
0.16
-0.04
0.21
0.27
0.22
0.11
0.06
-0.15
0.09
417

1.00
0.22

0.42
0.31
-0.14
0.01
0.21
-0.07
0.33
0.34
0.25
0.18
0.05
-0.18
0.08
439

'Free’
profl help
(0/1)

1.00

0.08
-0.01
0.03
-0.03
0.02
-0.07
-0.02
0.01
0.06
-0.01
-0.01
0.04
0.02
439

No money
help: Selfconfidence
(0/1)

1.00
-0.18
-0.20
-0.10
0.03
0.18
0.07
0.07
-0.04
0.04
0.02
0.07
0.06
0.02
-0.03
0.04
1,155

No
money
help:
Distrust
(0/1)

1.00
-0.03
0.07
0.08
0.02
0.10
0.01
-0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.12
0.02
-0.06
-0.02
1,130

No
money
help: DK
whom to
ask (0/1)

1.00
0.06
-0.02
-0.05
0.05
-0.10
-0.04
0.06
0.01
0.03
-0.03
0.00
-0.02
0.04
1,130
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Appendix Table A3. First-Stage Regressions of Cognition and Financial Literacy on
Instrumental Variables
This table presents coefficient estimates from the first-stage OLS regressions of Cognition and FinLit scores on two
instrumental variables, respectively, Vision problem and Economics class, along with all other controls. Variables are
described in Appendix 1. Regressors include missing data controls; standard errors reported in parentheses and
clustered at the household level. * and ** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively. Results
use HRS weights.

Cognition
-0.941 **
(0.333)
Economics class
0.125
(0.283)
Age
-0.126 **
(0.013)
Male
-0.578 *
(0.257)
White
1.785 **
(0.300)
Hispanic
-0.206
(0.430)
Married
0.949 **
(0.256)
Education (yrs)
0.509 **
(0.056)
Good health
0.857 *
(0.335)
Non-housing wealth (/100k, 2014$) 0.075 **
(0.025)
Housing wealth (/100k, 2014$)
0.005
(0.006)
Intercept
22.440 **
(1.175)
N
1,594
R-sq
0.318
Vision problem

FinLit
-0.249 **
(0.082)
0.249 **
(0.058)
-0.010 **
(0.003)
0.294 **
(0.051)
0.251 **
(0.067)
-0.266 *
(0.111)
0.071
(0.053)
0.050 **
(0.012)
0.128
(0.072)
0.015 **
(0.004)
0.002 **
(0.001)
1.588 **
(0.241)
1,594
0.226

